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Ringkasan 6 February Templat:Subscription or libraries Aitken, A. Languages of Scotland. Occasional paper — Association for Scottish Literary Studies; no. Edinburgh: Chambers. Alcaraz Ariza, M. Diakses tanggal 6 February Templat:Subscription or libraries Algeo, John Dalam Romaine, Suzanne. Cambridge History of the English Language.
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Varieties of English around the World. John Benjamins. Bailey, G. Dalam Edgar W. Englishes around the world. Bammesberger, Alfred Dalam Hogg, Richard M.
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English as a World Language. University of Michigan Press. Bauer, Laurie; Huddleston, Rodney The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Diakses tanggal 10 February Ringkasan PDF 10 February Baugh, Albert C. A History of the English Language edisi ke-5th.
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Cambridge Language Surveys. Diakses tanggal 26 February Hickey, R. Irish English: History and present-day forms. Legacies of colonial English: Studies in transported dialects. Hogg, Richard M. Diakses tanggal 9 August Oxford Dictionaries Online. How many words are there in the English language? There is no single sensible answer to this question.
It's impossible to count the number of words in a language, because it's so hard to decide what actually counts as a word. Huddleston, Rodney; Pullum, Geoffrey K.
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International Maritime Organization International Phonetic Association Jambor, Paul Z. Journal of English as an International Language. Jespersen, Otto []. The Philosophy of Grammar. Kachru, B. Templat:Subscription or libraries Kastovsky, Dieter Routledge Language Family Descriptions. The survey of the Germanic branch languages includes chapters by Winfred P.
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Berlin: de Gruyter. Lanham, L. Lass, Roger Phonology and Morphology". Dalam Blake, Norman. II: — Dalam Lass, Roger. Lawler, J. Templat:Subscription or libraries Lawton, David L. Leech, G. A glossary of English grammar. Edinburgh University Press. Change in contemporary English: a grammatical study. Diakses tanggal 22 September Levine, L. Sociological Inquiry. Li, David C. International Journal of the Sociology of Language. ISSN Lim, L. Templat:Subscription or libraries Maclagan, Margaret MacMahon, M.
English Phonetics". Macmillan Publishers Group Australia. Diakses tanggal 15 February Mair, C. The handbook of English linguistics. Mair, Christian Twentieth-century English: History, variation and standardization. Mazrui, Ali A.
University of Chicago Press. Ringkasan 15 February McArthur, Tom, ed. The Oxford Companion to the English Language. The Story of English edisi ke-Third Revised. London: Penguin Books. McGuinness, Diane Simon and Schuster. Meierkord, C.
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Diarsipkan dari versi asli PDF tanggal 24 December How English Became the Global Language. Palgrave Macmillan. Ringkasan 25 March O'Dwyer, Bernard Broadview Press. Office for National Statistics 4 March Patrick, P. Templat:Subscription or libraries Patrick, P. Nouns and noun phrases".
Dalam Huddleston, R. The Cambridge Grammar of English. Phillipson, Robert 28 April English-Only Europe? Richter, Ingo Language Rights Revisited: The challenge of global migration and communication. BWV Verlag. Roach, Peter English Phonetics and Phonology edisi ke-4th. Reactor 2 commenced operation in July , and Reactor 3 in March The earthquake design basis for all units ranged from 0.
At the time of the accident, the units and central storage facility contained the following numbers of fuel assemblies: [34]. There was no MOX fuel in any of the cooling ponds at the time of the incident. The only MOX fuel was loaded in the Unit 3 reactor. Nuclear reactors generate electricity by using the heat of the fission reaction to produce steam, which drives turbines that generate electricity. When the reactor stops operating, the radioactive decay of unstable isotopes in the fuel continues to generate heat decay heat for a time, and so requires continued cooling.
In the reactor core, high-pressure systems cycle water between the reactor pressure vessel and heat exchangers. These systems transfer heat to a secondary heat exchanger via the essential service water system , using water pumped out to sea or an onsite cooling tower. Unit 1 had a different, entirely passive cooling system, the Isolation Condenser IC. It consisted of a series of pipes run from the reactor core to the inside of a large tank of water.
When the valves were opened, steam flowed upward to the IC, where the cool water in the tank condenses the steam back to water that runs under gravity back to the reactor core. During a 25 March presentation to the TVA, Takeyuki Inagaki explained that unit 1's IC was operated intermittently to maintain reactor vessel level and to prevent the core from cooling too quickly, which can increase reactor power. As the tsunami engulfed the station, the IC valves were closed and could not be reopened automatically due to the loss of electrical power, but could have been opened manually.
When a reactor is not producing electricity, its cooling pumps can be powered by other reactor units, the grid, diesel generators, or batteries. Two emergency diesel generators were available for each of Units 1—5 and three for Unit 6. The Fukushima reactors were not designed for a large tsunami, [51] [52] nor had the reactors been modified when concerns were raised in Japan and by the IAEA. In accordance with GE's original specifications for the construction of the plant, each reactor's emergency diesel generators and DC batteries, crucial components in powering cooling systems after a power loss, were located in the basements of the reactor turbine buildings.
In the late s, three additional backup diesel generators for Units 2 and 4 were placed in new buildings located higher on the hillside, to comply with new regulatory requirements.
All six units were given access to these diesel generators, but the switching stations that sent power from these backup generators to the reactors' cooling systems for Units 1 through 5 were still located in the poorly protected turbine buildings.
Meanwhile, the switching station for Unit 6 was protected inside the only GE Mark II reactor building and continued to function.
If the switching stations had been moved to the interior of the reactor buildings or to other flood-proof locations, power would have been provided by these generators to the reactors' cooling systems and thus the catastrophe would have been averted.
However, this power plant had incorporated design changes that improved its resistance to flooding, thereby reducing flood damage. The diesel generators and related electrical distribution equipment were located in the watertight reactor building, and therefore this equipment remained functional.
By midnight, power from the electricity grid was being used to power the reactor-cooling pumps. Used fuel assemblies taken from reactors are initially stored for at least 18 months in the pools adjacent to their reactors. They can then be transferred to the central fuel storage pond.
After further cooling, fuel can be transferred to dry cask storage, which has shown no signs of abnormalities. Many of the internal components and fuel assembly cladding are made from zircaloy because it does not absorb neutrons.
The 9. This exceeded the seismic reactor design tolerances of 0. When the earthquake struck, units 1, 2, and 3 were operating, but units 4, 5, and 6 had been shut down for a scheduled inspection. As the reactors were now unable to generate power to run their own coolant pumps, emergency diesel generators came online, as designed, to power electronics and coolant systems. These operated normally until the tsunami destroyed the generators for Reactors 1—5.
The two generators cooling Reactor 6 were undamaged and were sufficient to be pressed into service to cool the neighboring Reactor 5 along with their own reactor, averting the overheating issues the other reactors suffered. The largest tsunami wave was 13—14 m 43—46 feet high and hit approximately 50 minutes after the initial earthquake, overwhelming the plant's ground level, which was 10 m 33 ft above the sea level. The waves flooded the basements of the power plant's turbine buildings and disabled the emergency diesel generators [50] [70] [71] at approximately All DC power was lost on Units 1 and 2 due to flooding, while some DC power from batteries remained available on Unit 3.
Steam-driven pumps provided cooling water to reactors 2 and 3 and prevented their fuel rods from overheating, as the rods continued to generate decay heat after fission had ceased. Eventually these pumps stopped working, and the reactors began to overheat. The lack of cooling water eventually led to meltdowns in Reactors 1, 2, and 3.
Further batteries and mobile generators were dispatched to the site, but were delayed by poor road conditions; the first arrived at 11 March, [76] [77] almost six hours after the tsunami struck. Unsuccessful attempts were made to connect portable generating equipment to power water pumps. The failure was attributed to flooding at the connection point in the Turbine Hall basement and the absence of suitable cables. As workers struggled to supply power to the reactors' coolant systems and restore power to their control rooms , three hydrogen-air chemical explosions occurred, the first in Unit 1 on 12 March, and the last in Unit 4, on 15 March.
The pressurized gas was vented out of the reactor pressure vessel where it mixed with the ambient air, and eventually reached explosive concentration limits in Units 1 and 3.
Due to piping connections between Units 3 and 4, or alternatively from the same reaction occurring in the spent fuel pool in Unit 4 itself, [83] Unit 4 also filled with hydrogen, resulting in an explosion. In each case, the hydrogen-air explosions occurred at the top of each unit, in their upper secondary containment buildings which in a BWR, are constructed out of steel panels which are intended to be blown off in the event of a hydrogen explosion. On 14 March, a similar explosion occurred in the Reactor 3 building, blowing off the roof and injuring eleven people.
The amount of damage sustained by the reactor cores during the accident, and the location of molten nuclear fuel " corium " within the containment buildings , is unknown; TEPCO has revised its estimates several times.
The erosion of the concrete of the PCV by the molten fuel after the core meltdown was estimated to stop at approx. Gas sampling carried out before the report detected no signs of an ongoing reaction of the fuel with the concrete of the PCV and all the fuel in Unit 1 was estimated to be "well cooled down, including the fuel dropped on the bottom of the reactor".
Fuel in Units 2 and 3 had melted, however less than in Unit 1, and fuel was presumed to be still in the RPV, with no significant amounts of fuel fallen to the bottom of the PCV. For Unit 2 and Unit 3 it was estimated that the "fuel is cooled sufficiently".
According to the report, the greater damage in Unit 1 when compared to the other two units was due to the longer time that no cooling water was injected in Unit 1. This resulted in much more decay heat accumulating, as for about 1 day there was no water injection for Unit 1, while Unit 2 and Unit 3 had only a quarter of a day without water injection.
In November , Mari Yamaguchi reported for Associated Press that there are computer simulations that suggest that "the melted fuel in Unit 1, whose core damage was the most extensive, has breached the bottom of the primary containment vessel and even partially eaten into its concrete foundation, coming within about 30 cm 1 ft of leaking into the ground" — a Kyoto University nuclear engineer said with regard to these estimates: "We just can't be sure until we actually see the inside of the reactors.
According to a December report, TEPCO estimated for Unit 1 that "the decay heat must have decreased enough, the molten fuel can be assumed to remain in PCV primary containment vessel ". According to this new estimate within the first three days of the accident the entire core content of Reactor 3 had melted through the RPV and fallen to the bottom of the PCV.
In March TEPCO released the result of the muon scan for Unit 1 which showed that no fuel was visible in the RPV, which would suggest that most if not all of the molten fuel had dropped onto the bottom of the PCV — this will change the plan for the removal of the fuel from Unit 1. Images showed a hole in metal grating beneath the reactor pressure vessel, suggesting that melted nuclear fuel had escaped the vessel in that area.
Ionizing radiation levels of about sieverts Sv per hour were subsequently detected inside the Unit 2 containment vessel. The handle from the top of a nuclear fuel assembly was also observed, confirming that a considerable amount of the nuclear fuel had melted. Reactor 4 was not operating when the earthquake struck. All fuel rods from Unit 4 had been transferred to the spent fuel pool on an upper floor of the reactor building prior to the tsunami.
On 15 March, an explosion damaged the fourth floor rooftop area of Unit 4, creating two large holes in a wall of the outer building. It was reported that water in the spent fuel pool might be boiling.
Visual inspection of the spent fuel pool on 30 April revealed no significant damage to the rods. A radiochemical examination of the pond water confirmed that little of the fuel had been damaged.
In October , the former Japanese Ambassador to Switzerland and Senegal, Mitsuhei Murata, said that the ground under Fukushima Unit 4 was sinking, and the structure may collapse.
This process was completed on 22 December Reactors 5 and 6 were also not operating when the earthquake struck. Unlike Reactor 4, their fuel rods remained in the reactor. The reactors had been closely monitored, as cooling processes were not functioning well.
One analysis, in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, stated that Government agencies and TEPCO were unprepared for the "cascading nuclear disaster" and the tsunami that "began the nuclear disaster could and should have been anticipated and that ambiguity about the roles of public and private institutions in such a crisis was a factor in the poor response at Fukushima".
Noda said "Everybody must share the pain of responsibility. According to Naoto Kan , Japan's prime minister during the tsunami, the country was unprepared for the disaster, and nuclear power plants should not have been built so close to the ocean. He said the disaster "laid bare a host of an even bigger man-made vulnerabilities in Japan's nuclear industry and regulation, from inadequate safety guidelines to crisis management, all of which he said need to be overhauled.
Physicist and environmentalist Amory Lovins said that Japan's "rigid bureaucratic structures, reluctance to send bad news upwards, need to save face, weak development of policy alternatives, eagerness to preserve nuclear power's public acceptance, and politically fragile government, along with TEPCO's very hierarchical management culture, also contributed to the way the accident unfolded. Moreover, the information Japanese people receive about nuclear energy and its alternatives has long been tightly controlled by both TEPCO and the government.
The Japanese government did not keep records of key meetings during the crisis. The data was not used because the disaster countermeasure office regarded the data as "useless because the predicted amount of released radiation is unrealistic.
On the evening of 15 March, Prime Minister Kan called Seiki Soramoto, who used to design nuclear plants for Toshiba, to ask for his help in managing the escalating crisis.
Soramoto formed an impromptu advisory group, which included his former professor at the University of Tokyo, Toshiso Kosako, a top Japanese expert on radiation measurement. Kosako, who studied the Soviet response to the Chernobyl crisis, said he was stunned at how little the leaders in the prime minister's office knew about the resources available to them. He quickly advised the chief cabinet secretary, Yukio Edano, to use SPEEDI, which used measurements of radioactive releases, as well as weather and topographical data, to predict where radioactive materials could travel after being released into the atmosphere.
The Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company 's interim report stated that Japan's response was flawed by "poor communication and delays in releasing data on dangerous radiation leaks at the facility". The report blamed Japan's central government as well as TEPCO, "depicting a scene of harried officials incapable of making decisions to stem radiation leaks as the situation at the coastal plant worsened in the days and weeks following the disaster".
The The erroneous assumption that the plant's cooling system would function after the tsunami worsened the disaster. The report said that these conflicts "produced confused flows of sometimes contradictory information". The report stated that the Japanese government was slow to accept assistance from U. A report in The Economist said: "The operating company was poorly regulated and did not know what was going on. The operators made mistakes. The representatives of the safety inspectorate fled.
Some of the equipment failed. The establishment repeatedly played down the risks and suppressed information about the movement of the radioactive plume, so some people were evacuated from more lightly to more heavily contaminated places. From 17 to 19 March , US military aircraft measured radiation within a 45 km 28 mi radius of the site. The data recorded micro sieverts per hour of radiation as far as 25 km The data were not forwarded to the prime minister's office or the Nuclear Safety Commission NSC , nor were they used to direct the evacuation.
Because a substantial portion of radioactive materials reached ground to the northwest, residents evacuated in this direction were unnecessarily exposed to radiation. Data on the dispersal of radioactive materials were provided to the U.
Although SPEEDI's effectiveness was limited by not knowing the amounts released in the disaster, and thus was considered "unreliable", it was still able to forecast dispersal routes and could have been used to help local governments designate more appropriate evacuation routes.
On 19 June , science minister Hirofumi Hirano stated that his "job was only to measure radiation levels on land" and that the government would study whether disclosure could have helped in the evacuation efforts. All residents of this village were evacuated after the government designated it a no-entry zone. According to a Japanese government panel, authorities had shown no respect for the lives and dignity of village people. One NISA official apologized for the failure and added that the panel had stressed the importance of disclosure; however, the mayor said that the information would have prevented the evacuation into highly polluted areas, and that apologies a year too late had no meaning.
In June , it was revealed that TEPCO officials had been instructed on 14 March not to describe the reactor damage using the word "meltdown". On day one, an estimated , people [] were evacuated from the prohibited access and on-alert areas.
Prime Minister Kan instructed people within the on-alert area to leave and urged those in the prepared area to stay indoors.
The earthquake and tsunami damaged or destroyed more than one million buildings leading to a total of , people needing evacuation. Of the ,, the nuclear accident was responsible for , being evacuated.
In , when the plant was built, TEPCO levelled the sea coast to make it easier to bring in equipment. This put the new plant at 10 meters 33 ft above sea level, rather than the original 30 meters 98 ft. The original plans separated the piping systems for two reactors in the isolation condenser from each other. However, the application for approval of the construction plan showed the two piping systems connected outside the reactor.
The changes were not noted, in violation of regulations. After the tsunami, the isolation condenser should have taken over the function of the cooling pumps, by condensing the steam from the pressure vessel into water to be used for cooling the reactor. However, the condenser did not function properly and TEPCO could not confirm whether a valve was opened. On 30 October , one of two backup generators of Reactor 1 failed, after flooding in the reactor's basement.
Seawater used for cooling leaked into the turbine building from a corroded pipe at 20 cubic meters per hour, as reported by former employees in December An engineer was quoted as saying that he informed his superiors of the possibility that a tsunami could damage the generators. TEPCO installed doors to prevent water from leaking into the generator rooms. The Japanese Nuclear Safety Commission stated that it would revise its safety guidelines and would require the installation of additional power sources.
On 29 December , TEPCO admitted all these facts: its report mentioned that the room was flooded through a door and some holes for cables, but the power supply was not cut off by the flooding, and the reactor was stopped for one day. One of the two power sources was completely submerged, but its drive mechanism had remained unaffected. An in-house TEPCO report in recommended safety measures against seawater flooding, based on the potential of a 50 foot 15 m tsunami.
TEPCO leadership said the study's technological validity "could not be verified. A in-house study identified an immediate need to better protect the facility from flooding by seawater.
This study mentioned the possibility of tsunami-waves up to Headquarters officials insisted that such a risk was unrealistic and did not take the prediction seriously. The U. Warnings by government committees, such as one in the Cabinet Office in , that tsunamis taller than the maximum of 5.
Japan, like the rest of the Pacific Rim , is in an active seismic zone , prone to earthquakes. Seismologist Katsuhiko Ishibashi wrote the book titled A Seismologist Warns criticizing lax building codes, which became a best seller when an earthquake in Kobe killed thousands shortly after its publication.
In he coined the term "nuclear earthquake disaster", and in wrote an article for the International Herald Tribune warning of a cascade of events much like the Fukushima disaster.
Radioactive material was released from the containment vessels for several reasons: deliberate venting to reduce gas pressure, deliberate discharge of coolant water into the sea , and uncontrolled events.
Concerns about the possibility of a large scale release led to a kilometer 12 mi exclusion zone around the power plant and recommendations that people within the surrounding 20—30 km 12—19 mi zone stay indoors.
Later, the UK, France, and some other countries told their nationals to consider leaving Tokyo, in response to fears of spreading contamination. The accident released — petabecquerels PBq of iodine and 6—20 PBq of caesium to the atmosphere, according to an estimate by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.
About 80 percent of the atmospheric releases were deposited over the ocean. In addition, 10—20 PBq of iodine and 3—6 PBq of caesium were released directly to the ocean. The Fukushima coast has some of the world's strongest currents and these transported the contaminated waters far into the Pacific Ocean, thus causing great dispersion of the radioactive elements.
The results of measurements of both the seawater and the coastal sediments led to the supposition that the consequences of the accident, in terms of radioactivity, would be minor for marine life as of autumn weak concentration of radioactivity in the water and limited accumulation in sediments.
On the other hand, significant pollution of sea water along the coast near the nuclear plant might persist, due to the continuing arrival of radioactive material transported towards the sea by surface water running over contaminated soil. Organisms that filter water and fish at the top of the food chain are, over time, the most sensitive to caesium pollution.
It is thus justified to maintain surveillance of marine life that is fished in the coastal waters off Fukushima. Despite caesium isotopic concentrations in the waters off of Japan being 10 to times above the normal concentrations prior to the accident, radiation risks are below what is generally considered harmful to marine animals and human consumers.
Researchers at the University of Tokyo 's Underwater Technology Research Center towed detectors behind boats to map hot spots on the ocean floor off Fukushima. Blair Thornton, an associate professor the university, said in that radiation levels remained hundreds of times as high as in other areas of the sea floor, suggesting ongoing contamination at the time from the plant. Radioactive isotopes were picked up by over 40 monitoring stations. The radioactive isotopes appeared in eastern Russia on 14 March and the west coast of the United States two days later.
By day 15, traces of radioactivity were detectable all across the northern hemisphere. In March , Japanese officials announced that "radioactive iodine exceeding safety limits for infants had been detected at 18 water-purification plants in Tokyo and five other prefectures".
Radioactive material was detected in food produced in , including spinach, tea leaves, milk, fish, and beef, up to kilometres from the plant.
Cabbage, rice [] and beef showed insignificant levels of radioactivity. A Fukushima-produced rice market in Tokyo was accepted by consumers as safe. This was approximately one four-millionth that of March. According to the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety , the release from Fukushima represents the most important individual oceanic emissions of artificial radioactivity ever observed. The Fukushima coast has one of the world's strongest currents Kuroshio Current.
It transported the contaminated waters far into the Pacific Ocean, dispersing the radioactivity. As of late measurements of both the seawater and the coastal sediments suggested that the consequences for marine life would be minor.
Significant pollution along the coast near the plant might persist, because of the continuing arrival of radioactive material transported to the sea by surface water crossing contaminated soil. The possible presence of other radioactive substances, such as strontium or plutonium , has not been sufficiently studied.
Recent measurements show persistent contamination of some marine species mostly fish caught along the Fukushima coast. Migratory pelagic species are highly effective and rapid transporters of radioactivity throughout the ocean. Elevated levels of caesium appeared in migratory species off the coast of California that were not seen pre-Fukushima.
The trace-level radioactivity was in dust blown across the Pacific Ocean. As of March , no cases of radiation-related ailments had been reported. Experts cautioned that data was insufficient to allow conclusions on health impacts. Michiaki Kai, professor of radiation protection at Oita University of Nursing and Health Sciences , stated, "If the current radiation dose estimates are correct, cancer-related deaths likely won't increase.
In August , researchers found that 10, nearby residents had been exposed to less than 1 millisievert of radiation, significantly less than Chernobyl residents. As of October , radioactivity was still leaking into the ocean. Fishing in the waters around the site was still prohibited, and the levels of radioactive Cs and Cs in the fish caught were not lower than immediately after the disaster.
On 26 October , TEPCO admitted that it could not stop radioactive material entering the ocean, although emission rates had stabilized. Undetected leaks could not be ruled out, because the reactor basements remained flooded. The company was building a 2,foot-long steel and concrete wall between the site and the ocean, reaching 30 meters 98 ft below ground, but it would not be finished before mid Around August two greenling were caught close to shore.
They contained more than 25, becquerels 0. On 22 July , it was revealed by TEPCO that the plant continued to leak radioactive water into the Pacific Ocean, something long suspected by local fishermen and independent investigators.
On 26 August, the government took charge of emergency measures to prevent further radioactive water leaks, reflecting their lack of confidence in TEPCO.
As of , about metric tons long tons; short tons of cooling water per day was being pumped into the reactors. Another metric tons long tons; short tons of groundwater was seeping into the structure.
Some metric tons long tons; short tons of water per day was removed for treatment, half of which was reused for cooling and half diverted to storage tanks. On 10 September , floodwaters driven by Typhoon Etau prompted mass evacuations in Japan and overwhelmed the drainage pumps at the stricken Fukushima nuclear plant. A TEPCO spokesperson said that hundreds of metric tons of radioactive water entered the ocean as a result. In March , numerous news sources, including NBC , [] began predicting that the radioactive underwater plume traveling through the Pacific Ocean would reach the western seaboard of the continental United States.
The common story was that the amount of radioactivity would be harmless and temporary once it arrived. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration measured caesium at points in the Pacific Ocean and models were cited in predictions by several government agencies to announce that the radiation would not be a health hazard for North American residents. Groups, including Beyond Nuclear and the Tillamook Estuaries Partnership, challenged these predictions on the basis of continued isotope releases after , leading to a demand for more recent and comprehensive measurements as the radioactivity made its way east.
These measurements were taken by a cooperative group of organizations under the guidance of a marine chemist with the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution , and revealed that total radiation levels, of which only a fraction bore the fingerprint of Fukushima, were not high enough to pose any direct risk to human life and in fact were far less than Environmental Protection Agency guidelines or several other sources of radiation exposure deemed safe.
Prior to Fukushima, the Chernobyl disaster was the only level 7 event on record, while the Mayak explosion was rated 6 and the Three Mile Island accident and Windscale fire were rated as level 5.
Unlike Chernobyl, all Japanese reactors were in concrete containment vessels, which limited the release of strontium , americium , and plutonium , which were among the radioisotopes released by the earlier incident. After ten half lives There were no deaths from radiation exposure in the immediate aftermath of the incident, though there were a number of around non-radiation related deaths during the evacuation of the nearby population.
The maximum predicted eventual cancer mortality and morbidity estimate according to the linear no-threshold theory is 1, and 1,, respectively, but with the strongest weight of evidence producing an estimate much lower, in the range of a few hundred.
In , the World Health Organization WHO indicated that the residents of the area who were evacuated were exposed to low amounts of radiation and that radiation-induced health impacts are likely to be low. The risks from a number of additional radiation-induced cancers are also expected to be elevated due to exposure caused by the other low boiling point fission products that were released by the safety failures.
In , the number of thyroid cancers or detections of developing thyroid cancers numbered The report also found that the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was incapable of withstanding the earthquake and tsunami. TEPCO, the regulatory bodies NISA and NSC and the government body promoting the nuclear power industry METI , all failed to correctly develop the most basic safety requirements — such as assessing the probability of damage, preparing for containing collateral damage from such a disaster, and developing evacuation plans for the public in the case of a serious radiation release.
TEPCO admitted for the first time on 12 October that it had failed to take stronger measures to prevent disasters for fear of inviting lawsuits or protests against its nuclear plants. In , tours to visit the Fukushima disaster area began. The museum exhibits items and videos about the earthquake and the nuclear accident.
To attract visitors from abroad, the museum offers explanations in English, Chinese and Korean. Discharge of radioactive water was reported as early as April A frozen soil barrier was constructed in an attempt to prevent further contamination of seeping groundwater by melted-down nuclear fuel , [] but in July TEPCO revealed that the ice wall had failed to stop groundwater from flowing in and mixing with highly radioactive water inside the wrecked reactor buildings, adding that "its ultimate goal has been to 'curtail' groundwater inflow, not halt it".
As of October , 1. The water is being treated by a purification system that can remove radionuclides , except tritium , to a level that Japanese regulations allow to be discharged to the sea.
However, tritium cannot be separated from the water. As of October , the total amount of tritium in the water was about terabecquerels , and the average tritium concentration was about 0. A committee set up by the Japanese Government concluded that the purified water should be released to the sea or evaporated to the atmosphere. The committee calculated that discharging all the water to the sea in one year would cause a radiation dose of 0. For comparison, Japanese people get microsieverts per year from natural radiation.
Further, IAEA recommends that a decision on the water disposal must be made urgently. Tanks used to store the water are expected to be filled by summer Other radioactive substances created as a byproduct of the contaminated water purification process, as well as contaminated metal from the damaged plant, have drawn recent attention as the 3, waste storage containers for the radioactive slurry were found to be degrading faster than expected.
Although people in the incident's worst affected areas have a slightly higher risk of developing certain cancers such as leukemia , solid cancers , thyroid cancer , and breast cancer , very few cancers would be expected as a result of accumulated radiation exposures. In , the World Health Organization reported that area residents who were evacuated were exposed to so little radiation that radiation-induced health effects were likely to be below detectable levels.
Outside the geographical areas most affected by radiation, even in locations within Fukushima prefecture, the predicted risks remain low, and no observable increases in cancer above natural variation in baseline rates are anticipated. The health risks were calculated by applying conservative assumptions, including the conservative linear no-threshold model of radiation exposure, a model that assumes even the smallest amount of radiation exposure will cause a negative health effect.
These percentages represent estimated relative increases over the baseline rates and are not absolute risks for developing such cancers. Due to the low baseline rates of thyroid cancer, even a large relative increase represents a small absolute increase in risks. For example, the baseline lifetime risk of thyroid cancer for females is just three-quarters of one percent and the additional lifetime risk estimated in this assessment for a female infant exposed in the most affected location is one-half of one percent.
The World Nuclear Association reports that the radiation exposure to those living in proximity to Fukushima is expected to be below 10 mSv, over the course of a lifetime. In comparison, the dosage of background radiation received over a lifetime is mSv. According to a linear no-threshold model LNT model , the accident would most likely cause cancer deaths. Jacobson has been described as "junk science" by Mark Lynas. In April , studies confirmed the presence of radioactive tuna off the coasts of the Pacific U.
However, the amount of radioactivity is less than that found naturally in a single banana. In June Tilman Ruff , co-president of the political advocacy group " International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War ", argues that , people have been unable to return to their homes and ecological diversity has decreased and malformations have been found in trees, birds, and mammals.
Five years after the event, the Department of Agriculture from the University of Tokyo which holds many experimental agricultural research fields around the affected area has noted that "the fallout was found at the surface of anything exposed to air at the time of the accident. The main radioactive nuclides are now caesium and caesium ", but these radioactive compounds have not dispersed much from the point where they landed at the time of the explosion, "which was very difficult to estimate from our understanding of the chemical behavior of cesium".
The atmosphere was not affected on a noticeable scale, as the overwhelming majority of the particulates settled either within the water system or soil surrounding the plant. In February , Japan renewed the export of fish caught off Fukushima's nearshore zone. According to prefecture officials, no seafood had been found with radiation levels exceeding Japan safety standards since April In , Thailand was the first country to receive a shipment of fresh fish from Japan's Fukushima prefecture.
Srisuwan Janya, chairman of the Stop Global Warming Association, said the FDA must protect the rights of consumers by ordering restaurants serving Fukushima fish to make that information available to their customers, so they could decide whether to eat it or not. On February , Japan suspended the sale of black rockfish from Fukushima after it was discovered that a catch was found to be 14 times more radioactive than the legally permitted level.
The World Health Organization stated that a thyroid ultrasound screening program was, due to the screening effect , likely to lead to an increase in recorded thyroid cases due to early detection of non- symptomatic disease cases. In October , children from the Fukushima Prefecture were described as either being diagnosed with or showing signs of developing thyroid cancer.
The study's lead author Toshihide Tsuda from Okayama University stated that the increased detection could not be accounted for by attributing it to the screening effect.
He described the screening results to be "20 times to 50 times what would be normally expected. However, despite his paper being widely reported by the media, [] an undermining error, according to teams of other epidemiologists who point out Tsuda's remarks are fatally wrong, is that Tsuda did an apples and oranges comparison by comparing the Fukushima surveys, which uses advanced ultrasound devices that detect otherwise unnoticeable thyroid growths, with data from traditional non-advanced clinical examinations, to arrive at his "20 to 50 times what would be expected" conclusion.
Wakeford's criticism was one of seven other author's letters that were published criticizing Tsuda's paper. In Ohira et al. Ohira et al. There were no significant associations between individual external doses and prevalence of thyroid cancer.
External radiation dose was not associated with thyroid cancer prevalence among Fukushima children within the first 4 years after the nuclear accident. A publication by Yamashita et al. They noted that the mean age of the patients at the time of the accident was 10—15 years, while no cases were found in children from the ages of 0—5 who would have been most susceptible. Yamashita et al. A investigation by Yamamoto et al. The average radiation dose-rates in the 59 municipalities of the Fukushima prefecture in June and the corresponding thyroid cancer detection rates in the period October to March show statistically significant relationships.
This corroborates previous studies providing evidence for a causal relation between nuclear accidents and the subsequent occurrence of thyroid cancer. As of , research into the correlation between air-dose and internal-dose and thyroid cancers remains ongoing. Ohba et al. The authors concluded there remains no statistically detectable evidence of increased thyroid cancer diagnosis due to radiation.
Radiation deaths at Chernobyl were also statistically undetectable. Only 0. Data from Chernobyl showed that there was a steady but sharp increase in thyroid cancer rates following the disaster in , but whether this data can be directly compared to Fukushima is yet to be determined.
Chernobyl thyroid cancer incidence rates did not begin to increase above the prior baseline value of about 0. In the former Soviet Union , many patients with negligible radioactive exposure after the Chernobyl disaster displayed extreme anxiety about radiation exposure.
They developed many psychosomatic problems, including radiophobia along with an increase in fatalistic alcoholism.
As Japanese health and radiation specialist Shunichi Yamashita noted: []. We know from Chernobyl that the psychological consequences are enormous. Life expectancy of the evacuees dropped from 65 to 58 years — not because of cancer, but because of depression , alcoholism, and suicide.
Relocation is not easy, the stress is very big. We must not only track those problems, but also treat them. Otherwise people will feel they are just guinea pigs in our research. A survey [ when? The survey showed that many residents are experiencing growing frustration, instability, and an inability to return to their earlier lives. Sixty percent of respondents stated that their health and the health of their families had deteriorated after evacuating, while Summarizing all responses to questions related to evacuees' current family status, one-third of all surveyed families live apart from their children, while The survey also showed that A total of Stress often manifests in physical ailments, including behavioral changes such as poor dietary choices, lack of exercise, and sleep deprivation.
Survivors, including some who lost homes, villages, and family members, were found likely to face mental health and physical challenges. Much of the stress came from lack of information and from relocation.
The resulting outcomes included depressive symptoms , anxiety , sleep disturbance , social functioning , social isolation , admission rates, suicide rates and cerebral structure changes, radiation impacting food safety, maternal anxiety and lowered maternal confidence.
In a risk analysis , relying on the metric of potential months of life lost , it determined that unlike Chernobyl, "relocation was unjustified for the , people relocated after Fukushima", when the potential future deaths from exposure to radiation around Fukushima, would have been much less, if the alternative of the shelter in place protocol had instead been deployed.
In January , the number of Fukushima evacuees was around ,, compared with a peak of around , in June Worldwide media coverage of the incident has been described as "ten years of disinformation", with media and environmental organisations routinely conflating the casualties of the earthquake and tsunami, with casualties of the nuclear incident.
The incident dominated media coverage while the victims of the natural disasters were "ignored", and a number of media reports incorrectly describing thousands of victims of tsunami as if they were victims of the "nuclear disaster". According to reinsurer Munich Re , the private insurance industry will not be significantly affected by the disaster. In March , a Japanese court ruled that negligence by the Japanese government had led to the Fukushima disaster by failing to use its regulatory powers to force TEPCO to take preventive measures.
Its decision covered three class-action lawsuits, among more than 30 filed against the utility. On 17 June , the Supreme Court acquitted the government of any wrongdoing regarding potential compensation to over 3, people affected by the disaster.
By March , one year after the disaster, all but two of Japan's nuclear reactors had been shut down; some had been damaged by the quake and tsunami. Authority to restart the others after scheduled maintenance throughout the year was given to local governments, which all decided against reopening them. According to The Japan Times , the disaster changed the national debate over energy policy almost overnight. It also omitted a section on nuclear power expansion that was in the previous year's policy review.
The nuclear plant closest to the epicenter of the earthquake, the Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant , successfully withstood the cataclysm. Reuters said it may serve as a "trump card" for the nuclear lobby, providing evidence that it is possible for a correctly designed and operated nuclear facility to withstand such a cataclysm. One estimate is that even including the disaster, more years of life would have been lost in if Japan had used coal or gas plants instead of nuclear.
Many political activists have called for a phase-out of nuclear power in Japan, including Amory Lovins , who claimed, "Japan is poor in fuels , but is the richest of all major industrial countries in renewable energy that can meet the entire long-term energy needs of an energy-efficient Japan, at lower cost and risk than current plans. Japanese industry can do it faster than anyone — if Japanese policymakers acknowledge and allow it".
Sovacool asserted that Japan could have exploited instead its renewable energy base. Japan has a total of " GW of achievable potential in the form of onshore and offshore wind turbines GW , geothermal power plants 70 GW , additional hydroelectric capacity In contrast, others have said that the zero mortality rate from the Fukushima incident confirms their opinion that nuclear fission is the only viable option available to replace fossil fuels.
Journalist George Monbiot wrote "Why Fukushima made me stop worrying and love nuclear power. I now support the technology. The electricity supply failed, knocking out the cooling system. The reactors began to explode and melt down. The disaster exposed a familiar legacy of poor design and corner-cutting.
Yet, as far as we know, no one has yet received a lethal dose of radiation. In September , Mycle Schneider said that the disaster can be understood as a unique chance "to get it right" on energy policy.
On the other hand, climate and energy scientists James Hansen , Ken Caldeira , Kerry Emanuel , and Tom Wigley released an open letter calling on world leaders to support development of safer nuclear power systems, stating "There is no credible path to climate stabilization that does not include a substantial role for nuclear power. As of September [update] , Japan planned to build a pilot offshore floating wind farm , with six 2 MW turbines, off the Fukushima coast. Canadian Solar received financing for its plans to build a factory in Japan with capacity of MW, scheduled to begin production in As of September , the Los Angeles Times reported that "Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda acknowledged that the vast majority of Japanese support the zero option on nuclear power", [] and Prime Minister Noda and the Japanese government announced plans to make the country nuclear-free by the s.
They announced the end to construction of nuclear power plants and a year limit on existing nuclear plants. Nuclear plant restarts must meet safety standards of the new independent regulatory authority. On 16 December , Japan held its general election. Abe supported nuclear power, saying that leaving the plants closed was costing the country 4 trillion yen per year in higher costs. Marchers had gathered more than 8 million petition signatures opposing nuclear power. From to the nation fired up at least eight new coal power plants.
Plans for an additional 36 coal stations over the next decade are the biggest planned coal power expansion in any developed nation. A number of nuclear reactor safety system lessons emerged from the incident. The most obvious was that in tsunami-prone areas, a power station's sea wall must be adequately tall and robust. Nuclear power station operators around the world began to install Passive Autocatalytic hydrogen Recombiners "PARs" , which do not require electricity to operate.
Had such devices been positioned at the top of Fukushima I's reactor buildings, where hydrogen gas collected, the explosions would not have occurred and the releases of radioactive isotopes would arguably have been much less. Unpowered filtering systems on containment building vent lines, known as Filtered Containment Venting Systems FCVS , can safely catch radioactive materials and thereby allow reactor core depressurization, with steam and hydrogen venting with minimal radioactivity emissions.
This system was built prior to Fukushima Daiichi. Upon a station blackout , similar to the one that occurred after Fukushima's back-up battery supply was exhausted, [] many constructed Generation III reactors adopt the principle of passive nuclear safety. They take advantage of convection hot water tends to rise and gravity water tends to fall to ensure an adequate supply of cooling water to handle the decay heat , without the use of pumps. As the crisis unfolded, the Japanese government sent a request for robots developed by the U.
The robots went into the plants and took pictures to help assess the situation, but they couldn't perform the full range of tasks usually carried out by human workers. In response to this shortcoming, a series of competitions were hosted by DARPA to accelerate the development of humanoid robots that could supplement relief efforts. Japanese authorities later admitted to lax standards and poor oversight. Public anger emerged over what many saw as "an official campaign to play down the scope of the accident and the potential health risks".
In many cases, the Japanese government's reaction was judged to be less than adequate by many in Japan, especially those who were living in the region. Decontamination equipment was slow to be made available and then slow to be utilized. As late as June , even rainfall continued to cause fear and uncertainty in eastern Japan because of its possibility of washing radioactivity from the sky back to earth. To assuage fears, the government enacted an order to decontaminate over a hundred areas where the level of additional radiation was greater than one millisievert per year.
This is a much lower threshold than is necessary for protecting health. The government also sought to address the lack of education on the effects of radiation and the extent to which the average person was exposed. Previously a proponent of building more reactors, Prime Minister Naoto Kan took an increasingly anti-nuclear stance following the disaster. In May , he ordered the aging Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant closed over earthquake and tsunami concerns, and said he would freeze building plans.
In July , Kan said, "Japan should reduce and eventually eliminate its dependence on nuclear energy". On 22 August , a government spokesman mentioned the possibility that some areas around the plant "could stay for some decades a forbidden zone". According to Yomiuri Shimbun the Japanese government was planning to buy some properties from civilians to store waste and materials that had become radioactive after the accidents.
He added that he could "understand the concerns of foreign countries over recent developments at the nuclear plant, including the radioactive contamination of seawater". Due to frustration with TEPCO and the Japanese government "providing differing, confusing, and at times contradictory, information on critical health issues" [] a citizen's group called " Safecast " recorded detailed radiation level data in Japan.
The Japanese government decided to pump radioactive water to the Pacific after the Tokyo Olympics. The international reaction to the disaster was diverse and widespread. Many inter-governmental agencies immediately offered help, often on an ad hoc basis.
The main finding of this mission, as reported to the IAEA ministerial conference that month, was that risks associated with tsunamis in several sites in Japan had been underestimated. In the aftermath, Germany accelerated plans to close its nuclear power reactors and decided to phase the rest out by [] see also Nuclear power in Germany.
Belgium and Switzerland have also changed their nuclear policies to phase-out all nuclear energy operations. However, the government earmarked only one power station for closure — the aging Fessenheim Nuclear Power Plant on the German border — which prompted some to question the government's commitment to Hollande's promise. Industry Minister Arnaud Montebourg is on record as saying that Fessenheim will be the only nuclear power station to close.
China suspended its nuclear development program briefly, but restarted it shortly afterwards. The initial plan had been to increase the nuclear contribution from 2 to 4 percent of electricity by , with an escalating program after that. China plans to triple its nuclear energy output to , and triple it again between and New nuclear projects were proceeding in some countries.
KPMG reports new nuclear facilities planned or proposed for completion by Three investigations into the Fukushima disaster showed the man-made nature of the catastrophe and its roots in regulatory capture associated with a "network of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. In August , several top energy officials were fired by the Japanese government; affected positions included the Vice-minister for Economy, Trade and Industry ; the head of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, and the head of the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy.
In three former TEPCO executives, chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata and two vice presidents, were indicted for negligence resulting in death and injury. And its effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human response. The Commission recognized that the affected residents were still struggling and facing grave concerns, including the "health effects of radiation exposure, displacement, the dissolution of families, disruption of their lives and lifestyles and the contamination of vast areas of the environment".
The purpose of the Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations ICANPS was to identify the disaster's causes and propose policies designed to minimize the damage and prevent the recurrence of similar incidents. The panel's report faulted an inadequate legal system for nuclear crisis management, a crisis-command disarray caused by the government and TEPCO, and possible excess meddling on the part of the Prime Minister's office in the crisis' early stage.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. The four damaged reactor buildings from left: Units 4, 3, 2, and 1 on 16 March Hydrogen-air explosions in Units 1, 3, and 4 caused structural damage. Main article: Fukushima Daiichi units 4, 5 and 6. See also: Investigations into the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.
Further information: Comparison of Fukushima and Chernobyl nuclear accidents. Main article: Accident rating of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Main article: Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster casualties. World Health Organization. Archived from the original PDF on 22 October Main article: Comparison of Fukushima and Chernobyl nuclear accidents. Main article: Japanese reaction to Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.
Main article: International reactions to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. Japan portal Energy portal Nuclear technology portal. Comparison of the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear accidents Environmental issues in Japan Fukushima disaster cleanup Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster casualties List of Japanese nuclear incidents List of civilian nuclear accidents Lists of nuclear disasters and radioactive incidents Nuclear power in Japan Nuclear power phase-out Radiation effects from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster Martin Fackler journalist.
Japan: Air Photo Service. Retrieved 14 January IEEE Spectrum. BBC News. Retrieved 25 April ABC News. Retrieved 30 April April Clinical Oncology.
PMID Kyodo News. Retrieved 12 February The Guardian. Retrieved 14 December International Business Times. Archived from the original on 15 August Retrieved 23 June Bibcode : EnST Archived from the original PDF on 22 November Warnings: Finding Cassandras to stop catastrophe.
Harper Collins. The New York Times. Retrieved 18 August Wald 1 May JP : Reconstruction Agency. Retrieved 2 June Vienna: United Nations Information Service. Royal Society of Chemistry. October Retrieved 12 July Archived from the original on 18 March Retrieved 10 March Archived from the original on 6 October Retrieved 13 October Archived from the original on 9 March Associated Press. Archived from the original on 5 October CNN Wire Staff.
Archived from the original on 15 March
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